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Executive Summary
Applying principles of merger evaluation to the health care indus-
try in general, and to hospital markets in particular, poses several
unique challenges. Definition of relevant geographic markets and
assessment of the consequences of changes in competition for patient
and social welfare are complicated by asymmetric information and
moral hazard due to health insurance. We suggest a new empirical
approach to assessing the impact of hospital competition, which
addresses the shortcomings of existing methods. We then summarize
our main results on the welfare consequences of competition. We
conclude with an illustration of how our methods can be used to
assess the welfare implications of specific hospital mergers, and with
some implications of our findings for antitrust policy.
I.Introduction
Government policies toward competition among health carepro-
viders have been the subject of considerable debate (Gaynor and
Vogt 1998). In the health care industry, competition policy most often
focuses on hospital mergers, though mergers among physician
organizations and insurers are increasingly facing antitrust scrutiny.
The general process of merger evaluation is well developed. First,
the relevant market is defined, in terms of both products and geogra-
phy. The geographic market definition suggested by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines (1992)
for assessing the impact of competition on social welfare (Vistnes
1995; Scheffman and Spiller 1987) is that a geographic market should
be comprised of the smallest geographic area over which a hypo-54 Kessler and McClellan
thetical monopolist could profitably impose a small but significant
and nontransitory increase in prices. Second, the likely consequences
of any changes in competition as a result of the proposed merger
are assessed. According to the MergerGuidelines, this part of the
evaluation process typically involves identifying the competing firms,
and summarizing the likely changes in the extent of competition in
terms of a quantitative index. The most widely usedindex is the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), defined as the sum of squared
output shares of the firms in the market. The impact of theproposed
merger on welfare is viewed as a functionof the change in HHI that
would occur as a result of the merger, as well as a function of other
factors (such as efficiency gains or the avoidance of closure) that
might mitigate or enhance the impact of changes in market structure.
All else constant, mergers that result in large increases in the HHI
are considered to be more sociallyharmful than are mergers that
do not.
Applying these general principles of merger evaluation to the health
care industry poses several unique challenges. Howshould relevant
product and geographic markets be defined, when many difficult-
to-measure factors like quality of care, asymmetric information,and
special payment arrangements may influence the extent to which
providers compete with one another? How should the welfare effects
of mergers be assessed, when the consequences of the medical pro-
duction processresource use and patient health outcomesare not
only affected by competition, but also by a complex combination of
the medical services supplied by providers, insurance arrangements,
and unobservable differences in patients' health status? Because of
the complexity of health care production and many distinctive fea-
tures of health care markets, these questions are difficult to answer
definitively, on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
We begin by reviewing previous studies on the two key compo-
nents of evaluations of hospital mergers: the definition ofrelevant
markets, and the assessment of the consequences of changes in corn-
petition for patient and social welfare. We then summarize our
approach to assessing the impact of hospital competition, the reasons
why our approach addresses the shortcomings of existing methods,
and our main results on the welfare consequences of competition
(detailed discussion of our methods and results can be found in
Kessler and McClellan 1998). We conclude with an illustration of
how our methods can be used to assess the welfare consequences ofDesigning Hospital Antitrust Policy to Promote Social Welfare 55
specific hospital mergers, and with some implications of our methods
for antitrust policy.
II.Previous Studies to Guide Hospital Antitrust Policy
Market Definition
In most hospital antitrust cases, market definitions involve evidence
on patterns of patients' hospital choicesthe flows of patients to
hospitals. Under the Elzinga-Hogarty (1978) method, for example, a
market's boundaries are defined so that relatively few consumers
purchase services from outside the area, and few outside consumers
purchase within the area. Much of the debate in antitrust cases
centers on what constitutes "significant" patient flows, since such
flows define the extent of the market. Are outlying suburbs and their
community hospitals to be included in the market facing medical
centers in a central city? What about the home areas of patients who
travel substantial distances for referral care at a well-known teaching
hospital?
For all the time that such questions consume in antitrust proceed-
ings, much of the recent economic literature on competition suggests
that market definitions based on patient flows may result in a funda-
mentally misleading picture of competition. Economists regard actual
flows as endogenous. For example, suppose that a hospital delivers
care of particularly high quality or low cost, not because of competi-
tive pressures from other hospitals but because that hospital has
developed good management techniques or contracted with highly
skilled staff. It is likely that patients would be willing to come from
farther away to receive this care. According to patient flows, the rel-
evant market containing this hospital would appear to be larger
compared to that of an otherwise similar but "average" hospital.
Conversely, a community hospital may attract patients only from the
very nearest neighborhoods, and thus appear to have a very small
market area, not because of any lack of competition but simply
because it is a bad hospital. Patient flows reflect important factors
other than competition among providers, and so they may lead to
biased conclusions about the competitiveness of the "market"
defined based on these flows. In effect, the method leads to excessive
concern over mergers involving low-quality hospitals and insufficient
concern over mergers involving high-quality ones.56 Kessler and McClellan
For example, the "variable radius" method of hospital market def-
inition (e.g., Zwanziger and Melnick 1988) defines the radius of each
hospital's relevant geographic market to be equal to the minimum
necessary to include a fixed percentage of that hospital's patients,
often 60 or 75 percent (Garnick et al. 1987). 1 However, if variations
in hospital quality are difficult for regulators to observe but affect
patient choices, estimates of the impact of competition on treatment,
expenditures, and health outcomes based on variable-radius geo-
graphic markets may be biased (Werden 1989). Moreover, the net
effect of the bias is unclear. If unobservably high-quality hospitals
have higher costs and attract patients from a wider geographic area
than do low-quality hospitals, the high-quality hospitals will appear
to have larger variable-radius geographic markets, thus appearing to
be subject to greater competitive forces.2 If the true effect of competi-
tion is to reduce costs and improve quality, then unobserved hospital
heterogeneity will lead to underestimation of the effect of competi-
tion on cost and overestimation of the effect of competition on quality
(by leading to the overstatement of the competitive forces facing
high-cost, high-quality hospitals). If the true effect of competition is
to increase costs and worsen outcomes, then unobserved hospital
heterogeneity will lead to overestimation of the effect of competition
on cost and underestimation of the effect of competition on quality.3
The most common method used in research studies to avoid this
problem defines a hospital's geographic market as a fixed circular
area around its location. The "fixed radius" method of measuring
geographic markets defines a hospital's competitors to include all
other hospitals located within a fixed distance around the hospital
(e.g., Robinson and Luft 1985). But this method does not solve the
market definition problem: it is very unlikely that all hospitals face
similar-sized geographic markets, so that the method results in geo-
graphic markets that are measured with error. The fixed distance will
overstate the true size of some markets and understate the true size
of others. For example, consider a fixed-radius definition of hospital
market areas that, on average, is equal to the true size of hospital
markets. Those markets in which the fixed size overstates the true
size of the geographic market will have measures of market structure
that overstate the market's competitiveness; those markets in which
the fixed size understates the true size will have measures of market
structure that understate the market's competitiveness.5 To provide a
useful guide to market competitiveness, a market definition must atDesigning Hospital Antitrust Policy to Promote Social Welfare 57
least consider the types of hospitals in the market and the types of
medical services provided or potentially provided by all of these
hospitals. A policy based on a fixed market size is not a practical
approach to such an evaluation, or an appealing one on common-
sense grounds, because it does not reflect many factors that influence
competitiveness. But as we have seen, a policy that goes too far in the
other directiondefining markets based on actual flowsalso
results in a biased market definition, because it reflects too many fac-
tors other than competitiveness.
For these reasons, recent industrial-organization studies have
tended to focus on how consumers choose among alternative firms,
and not on "market structure" based on arbitrary geographic boun-
daries. Ideally, consumer demand for a hospital as a function of cost
and quality would be fully known, making it straightforward to de-
termine whether a proposed merger or any other change affecting
potential competitors would affect social welfare. The effects on con-
sumer and producer surplus, and not the effects on any necessarily
arbitrary "market," would provide the foundation for evaluating
competitive effects. But determining hospital (or any other) demand
functions is extremely difficult, for much the same reasons that endo-
geneity problems exist in traditional measures of market structure. If
a neighboring hospital is particularly high quality, then the effects of
distance and other patient characteristics that influence choices will
appear different than for a hospital that is lower quality. Some pub-
lished studies in industries other than health care have avoided these
problems by imposing additional assumptions. These assumptions
provide "exogenous" variations in firm quality or cost that can be
observed and studied to estimate demand functions. But such
assumptions are particularly difficult to sustain for hospital care, in
which observable exogenous differences in quality and cost are often
correlated with unobserved influences that may be correlated with
but not caused by differences in competitiveness.
Impact of Changes in Competitiveness on Patient and Social
Welfare
Assuming that competitiveness in the areas served by a hospital
could be defined appropriately, the next step is to quantify the
impact of the proposed merger on the market, with an index such as
the HHI. Basic microeconomic theory naturally suggests that more53 Kessler and McClellan
competitive marketsthat is, markets with lower HHIsshould
make patients and society better off, but many theoretical studies in
economics have questioned this relationship in the health care sector.
For this reason, knowing the specific relationships among changes in
competitiveness, medical costs, and patient health outcomes is also
crucial for evaluating mergers.
The theoretical studies have noted that markets for health care
services in general, and markets for hospital services in particular,
deviate substantially from the stylized conditions required by basic
theory for competition to result in efficient outcomes. These condi-
tions include the existence of multiple buyers and multiple sellers of
a product or service who act as price takers, enjoy full or at least
symmetric information, and bear the full costs of their actions at the
margin. By considering conditions that plausibly deviate from these
basic assumptions, models of hospital competition suggest that it
may either improve or reduce social welfare.
Many models of how hospital competition may reduce social wel-
fare focus on distorted price signals and a more general absence of
price competition. Insurance and tax incentives may make consumers
relatively insensitive to price, for example, so that hospitals in more
competitive markets engage in a medical arms race (MAR) and sup-
ply socially excessive levels of medical care (Salkever 1978; Robinson
and Luft 1985).6 Further, hospitals were historically reimbursed on a
"cost-plus" basis, so that they too did not bear the marginal costs of
intensive treatment decisions. In addition, "quality competition"
may be socially excessive because of price regulation in the health
care industry (see Joskow 1983 and McClellan 1994 for a discussion).
Simple models of the airline industry (e.g., Douglas and Miller 1974;
Panzar 1979; Schmalensee 1977), for example, showed that regulated
pricing induced airlines to engage in nonprice competition, leading
airline markets with greater numbers of competitors to have higher
service levels. If the additional intensity of medical care resulting
from competition is excessive, in terms of improvements in patient
health outcomes whose value is less than the social costs of produc-
tion, then competition among hospitals would be socially wasteful.
MAR models tend to be viewed as theoretically outdated, because
of improved price competition among health plans. Competition
among insurers may lead to more effective bargaining over prices
with providers (e.g., Town and Vistnes 1997), or to patterns of care
that use medical technology in a more cost-effective way (e.g., PaulyDesigning Hospital Anfitrus Policy fo Promote Social Welfare 59
1988). To the extent that managed-care plans have more capacity to
negotiate and influence hospital practices, and consumers pay for the
marginal differences in premiums across managed-care plans, price
competition has become a more prominent feature of hospital com-
petition with the growth of managed care (Enthoven 1993). Such
price competition is likely to be greatest in areas where managed-
care health plans are most widespread.
Other aspects of hospital production besides the effects of insur-
ance and managed care on price and quality competition also make
it difficult to draw definitive theoretical conclusions about the con-
sequences of competition. Informational imperfections in hospital
markets may cause competition to reduce social welfare (e.g., Sat-
terthwaite 1979; Frech 1996). In addition, if hospital markets are
monopolistically competitive rather than perfectly competitive, more
competition may lead to less efficient levels of care (e.g., Frech 1996).
Although conventional wisdom is that monopolistic competition in
hospital markets yields too many providers and excess capacity (with
no hospital large enough to exhaust returns to scale), in fact monop-
olistic competition can lead to either socially excessive or inadequate
capacity (Tirole 1988, sec. 7.2). Further, a substantial fraction of hos-
pitals are nonprofit institutions, which may have different objectives
and behave differently than their for-profit counterparts (e.g., Hans-
mann 1980; Kopit and McCann 1988; Lynk 1995). Models of competi-
tion based on for-profit objectives may not accurately characterize
the welfare implications of interactions in hospital markets.
Finally, identifying the effect of competition is complicated by
other hospital or area factors that may be correlated with it, or that
may mediate its effects. These additional factors include hospital bed
capacity and competition in health insurance markets. Measuring
the impact of these factors on expenditures and health outcomes is
important in its own right. Substantial research, starting with Roemer
(1961), has suggested that high levels of bed capacity per patient
lead to longer lengths of stay and higher costs; more recent research
indicates that hospitals which treat relatively few cases of any partic-
ular type may deliver lower-quality care. On the other hand, high
levels of capacity per patient may reduce the travel distance and time
necessary to obtain treatment, which may lead to improved health
outcomes.
This theoretical ambiguity suggests that empirical evidence should
be used to guide antitrust enforcement. Many empirical studies have60 Kessler and McClellan
investigated the consequences of hospital competition (see Gaynor
and Haas-Wilson 1997 and Dranove and White 1994 for comprehen-
sive reviews). In summary, research based on data from prior to the
mid-1980s finds that competition among hospitals leads to increases
in excess capacity, costs, and prices (Joskow 1980; Robinson and
Luft 1985, 1987; Noether 1988; Robinson 1988; Robinson et al. 1988;
Hughes and Luft 1991). Research based on more recent data gener-
ally finds that competition among hospitals leads to reductions in
excess capacity, costs, and prices (Zwanziger and Me]nick 1988;
Wooley 1989; Dranove, Shanley, and Simon 1992; Melnick et al. 1992;
Dranove, Shanley, and White 1993; Gruber 1994), with some impor-
tant exceptions (Robinson and Luft 1988; Mannheim et al. 1994).
The empirical literature has two well-known limitations. First and
foremost, virtually none of the literature assesses directly the impact
of competition either on resource use or on patient health outcomes;
as a result, it is not possible to draw any conclusions about patient
welfare without strong additional assumptions. Some studies do not
try to measure resource use at all. Many that do use "list" charges
rather than transaction prices (e.g., Noether 1988) even though fewer
and fewer patients pay undiscounted prices (Dranove, Shanley, and
White 1993). Even those studies that use transaction prices (e.g., Mel-
nick et al. 1992) or account for list-price/cost margins (e.g., Dranove,
Shanley, and White 1993) analyze the prices for a fixed basket of
services, despite the fact that the welfare losses from the absence
of hospital competition are likely to arise from changes in the mix of
services provided, rather than from increases in prices for a given
basket of services. Other studies measure the effects of competition
on the profitability of for-profit hospitals (Wooley 1989), on account-
ing costs per case mix adjusted admission (Robinson and Luft 1985,
1987, 1988; Zwanziger and Melnick 1988; Mannheim et al. 1994), on
employment of specialized personnel (Robinson 1988), on lengths of
stay (Robinson et al. 1988), and on patterns of provision of specific
hospital services (Hughes and Luft 1991; Dranove, Shanley, and
Simon 1992).
We have identified only one previous economic study that sought
to assess the consequences of competition for patient health out-
comes. Shortell and Hughes (1988) find no statistically significant
effects of hospital competition on in-hospital mortality rates for
Medicare patients in 1983-84. However, they only investigate the
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measure of health: if longer hospital stays improve patient health but
provide more time for deaths to occur, better outcomes might be
associated with higher in-hospital mortality. No studies have exam-
ined comprehensive or longer-term health effects.
Second, determining the empirical relationship between competi-
tiveness and industry performance is subject to the same endogeneity
problems that arise in defining markets. For example, some studies
have calculated HHIs equal to the sum of squared shares of hospital
beds or number of admissions in a given geographic market, matched
HHIs to individual patients based on their hospital of admission, and
then estimated the impact of the HHI on the cost of a baseline type of
hospital admission or on the price of a particular treatment. This can
lead to biased estimates of the impact of market structure because a
patient's hospital of admission, and thus her HHI, may depend on
unobserved determinants of her health status. Suppose patients who
are sicker value hospital quality more highly, and require more
costly treatment. If the true effect of competition is to reduce costs
and improve quality, then the fact that such sicker patients value
higher-quality hospitals more will induce a negative correlation be-
tween, a hospital's HHI and costs (and induce positive correlation
between a hospital's HHI and patient health outcomes). Put another
way, unobserved patient heterogeneity will lead to underestimation
of the beneficial impact of competition on both costs and on health
outcomes, and may even lead to the conclusion that competition is
socially wasteful, if bias resulting from patient selection is sufficiently
large.
In any event, most of these studies are now viewed as less relevant
because of changes in the health care industry in the 1990s, most
notably the growth of managed care. Increased managed care pene-
tration is generally a reflection of price and quality competition in
health insurance purchasing decisions, and is associated with slower
growth in medical expenditures (Baker 1996). However, few studies
have examined the consequences of managed care growth for health
outcomes, leaving important unresolved questions about the impact
of managed care on patient welfare. Moreover, existing studies pro-
vide little insight into the mechanism through which managed care
achieves its effects, and most importantly into how managed care
may interact with competition in hospital markets. Can it substitute
for hospital competition in limiting medical spending, or does compe-
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of managed care for health outcomes differ in areas with more or less
competition among providers? Surprisingly, even though negotia-
tions and other interactions with hospitals and other providers are
the principal mechanism through which managed care is thought to
influence medical practices, no studies have examined how managed
care interacts with hospital competition to affect patient well-being.
Thus, although the previous literature has provided a range of
insights about variation in hospital competition and the relation of
competitiveness to measures of hospitals' behavior, it has not pro-
vided direct empirical evidence on how competition affects social
welfare. Furthermore, because the literature has analyzed measures of
market competitiveness that are not based on exogenous determi-
nants of the demand for hospital services, and because these mea-
sures may be correlated with other determinants of costs and
outcomes like hospital capacity, the resulting estimates of the effects
of competition may be biased. Finally, very few studies have assessed
the effects of competition in recent health care environments, in
which managed care figures prominently.
As a result, neither the theoretical nor the existing empirical litera-
ture in health economics provides clear guidance for antitrust policy.
Current enforcement policies are implicitly based on the assumption
that competition improves social welfare, but the foundations for such
policies are at best uncertain. This lack of clear guidance for assessing
the impact of a merger on competitiveness, and in turn for assessing
the implications of changes in competitiveness for patient well-being
and social welfare, may account for some recent difficulties faced by
government agencies in winning hospital merger cases. Virtually no
previous empirical research has developed measures of competi-
tiveness that do not suffer from the biases created by traditional
approaches to market definition. No previous studies have examined
effects of competition on both health care costs and patient health
outcomes. Without these elements, conclusions about the effects of a
merger on welfare are necessarily highly speculative.
III.Recent Kessler-McClellan Research on Hospital Competition
Methods
Our recent research seeks to address these weaknesses in the foun-
dations of hospital antitrust policy. Our initial research has studiedDesigning Hospital Antitrust Policy to Promote Social Welfare 63
the effects of hospital competition for all nonrural elderly Medicare
recipients hospitalized for a treatment of a new heart attack and
other types of coronary heart disease in 1985-94. We focus on par-
ticular illnesses to allow us to study effects of competition on impor-
tant health outcomes as well as on treatment and resource use;
relevant outcomes differ by disease. Treatment of heart disease is the
largest single component of hospital production, accounting for
around one-sixth of hospital expenditures, so it is likely to provide
the best indicator of the effects of competition. As we describe below,
similar methods can be applied to other common illnesses and
patient populations.
We avoid the endogeneity and measurement problems in defining
markets and measuring variations in competitiveness by developing
models of how patients choose hospitals based on relatively exoge-
nous characteristics of hospitals and patients.We consider how these
variations in competitiveness resulting from the exogenous determi-
nants of hospital choice interact with managed care in an area to
influence medical treatment decisions, health care costs, and health
care outcomes. Because we observe information onhospital competi-
tion and HMOs over a long time horizon, we estimate the impact of
changes in area competitiveness on changes in hospital expenditures,
readmission rates for subsequent cardiac illness, and on mortality
rates, holding constant fixed effects for zip code areas. Theseaddi-
tional features of our model allow us to control for all time-invariant
heterogeneity across small geographic areas, hospitals, and patient
populations.
Our first step is to analyze how patients choose hospitals, as a
function of relatively exogenous (from the standpoint of individual
patient decisions) characteristics of patients and hospitals. These hos-
pital characteristics include hospital size category (e.g., fewer than
100 beds), teaching status, and ownership. The patient characteristics
include demographic factors (age, gender, race), and distances from
each patient's residence to each area hospital. All surrounding hospi-
tals are included in our multivariate choice model, allowing us to
estimate predicted probabilities of admission for each patient to each
nearby hospital in the United States. These predicted probabilities
allow us to construct measures of hospital market competitiveness
for all heart attack patients in the United States that depend only on
exogenous patient and hospital characteristics, and so are notsubject
to the sources of bias that we have just reviewed.64 Kessler and McClellan





where HHI is the index in zip code k, and theand ,6 terms refer to
expected (not actual) shares of flows of patients between particular
zip codes and hospitals. The expected flows are predicted fromour
model of hospital choice, which, in turn, are a function only of ob-
servable exogenous patient and hospital characteristics. Specifically, j
indexes all hospitals and k indexes all zip codes. cJk is the expected
share of patients from zip code k who choose hospital j. The c'jk's rep-
resent the area (zip code) perspective on patient flows, and sum to 1
across all hospitals j = 1,. ,J. The /3kJ'represent the hospital per-
spective on patient flows, so that a particular /3kj is the expected
patient flow to hospital j from zip code k, as a share of the hospital's
total expected patients. The /JkJ'S sum to 1 over all zip codes k=
1,.,K for each hospital j. In a more technical paper (Kessler and
McClellan 1998), we describe our competition indices in more detail.
The index of competitiveness is related to the traditional Herfindahi-
Hirschman Index, but differs in important ways to more accurately
reflect how hospitals compete and to avoid the biases described in
the previous section. We illustrate these differences by describing
each term in the index. The last term in brackets (4) is simply the
expected traditional HHI for zip code k. If there were only one very
large hospital nearby zip k, then the HHI would be close to 1; if there
were many nearby hospitals, then the HHI would be lower. The mid-
dle term (/34) reflects the fact that a particular hospital j is
unlikely to be able to tailor its treatment quality and cost based on a
patient's particular location of residence. In principle, a hospital
could increase its economic rents by price- or quality-discriminating
among the patients it serves based on whether patients live in areas
with few or many hospital choices. But it seems very unlikely thata
hospital could effectively implement such discrimination in practice.
Instead, it is much more likely that each hospital makes decisions
about pricing and quality based on the collective demand function it
faces, which depends on the competitiveness of all the zip codes
it serves. Because zip codes that are a larger part of a hospital's
expected market figure more prominently in its decisions, the appro-
I
HHI =
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priate measure of competitiveness facing a particular hospital is a
weighted sum of the competitiveness measures of all of the zip codes
it serves, with weights based on the expected share of the zip code
in the hospital's total expected patient flow.
Hospital-level measures are appropriate for assessing the com-
petitiveness facing particular hospitals. However, hospital-level per-
formance comparisons may be biased because patients may choose
hospitals based on their health status and preferences, and many
aspects of particular cases are difficult to measure. As we have
described above, if greater competition leads to higher quality of
care, hospitals in more competitive areas may attract more severely
ill patients.8 For this reason, we analyze competition from the per-
spective of zip codes of patient residence, since patients are far less
likely to move across zip codes because of variations in hospital
quality than they are to choose hospitals because of variations in
hospital qualityOur competition index HHIJ is simply a weighted
average of the expected competitiveness for all hospitals that are
likely to treat patients from the zip code, with weights propor-
tional to the expected patient flows from the zip code to each hos-
pital. In other words, the index is the weighted average of the
competition indices for hospitals expected to treat patients in a given
geographic area of residence, weighted by the hospital's expected
share of that area's patients. This competition index appropriately
focuses attention not on the patients actually treated by a particular
hospital, but on the welfare of all patients in the area served by the
hospital.
Our indices avoid the major problems facing measures of competi-
tion used in previous studies and antitrust cases. They avoid biases
arising from geographic market definitions that depend on actual
flows of patients. They avoid the substantial measurement error that
stems from the use of fixed-radius or any other arbitrary geographic
boundaries to define markets. And, because they measure the com-
petitiveness of patients' areas of residence rather than the competi-
tiveness of the markets facing their hospitals of admission, they
avoid bias due to the correlation between patients' hospital choices
and unobserved determinants of their health status.
Finally, in contrast to virtually all previous studies, we assess the
impact of competition on both expenditures and several measures of
important dimensions of patient health. This attention to both health
and economic outcomes allows us to assess the welfare consequences66 Kessler and McClellan
of competition-induced differences in medical practice. These results
provide a foundation for determining the "cost-effectiveness" of
hospital competition. If competition among hospitals leads to lower
levels of treatment intensity, but not to higher levels of adverse
health outcomes, then competition among hospitals is socially bene-
ficial. If competition leads to higher levels of intensity, but not to
lower levels of adverse outcomes, competition is socially wasteful.
If variations in competition either increase or decrease both costs
and health, then our results still provide quantitative guidance for
policies. For example, if competition-induced intensity results in low
expenditures per year of life saved relative to generally accepted
costs per year of life saved of other medical treatments, then competi-
tion provides incentives for efficient care; but if competition-induced
intensity results in high expenditures per year of life saved, then
competition provides incentives for socially excessive care. Because
the precision with which we measure the consequences of hospital
competition is critical, we include all U.S. elderly patients with heart
diseases in 1985, 1988, 1991, and 1994 in our analysis.
Main Findings
We find that, before 1991, competition led to higher costs and lower
rates of adverse health outcomes for elderly Americans with heart
disease; but, after 1990, competition led both to substantially lower costs
and substantially lower rates of adverse outcomes. Thus, after 1990, hospi-
tal competition unambiguously improves both patient well-being and
overall social welfare. Increasing HMO enrollment over the sample
period partially explains the dramatic change in the impact of hospital
competition; hospital competition is unambiguously welfare improv-
ing throughout the sample period in geographic areas with above-
median HMO enrollment rates. Furthermore, point estimates of the
magnitude of the welfare benefits of competition are uniformly larger
for patients from states with high HMO enrollment as of their admis-
sion date, as compared to patients from states with relatively low
HMO enrollment. However, although HMOs have socially beneficial
spillover effects throughout the sample period, the incremental social
benefits attributable to HMO spillovers and hospital-competition!
HMO-spillover interactions have been decreasing in magnitude over
time. This finding may be due to the fact that cost-control efforts
implemented by HMOs in the 1980s had, with the widespread adop-Designing Hospital Antitrust Policy to Promote Social Welfare 67
tion of HMOs by the 1990s, diffused to areas with relatively low
HMO enrollment.
The socially beneficial impact of increases in competition post-1990
differs in differently competitive markets. The effect of an interquartile
change in competitiveness on expenditures and outcomes is much
greater for areas moving to or from the most and least competitive
quartiles. Mergers that result in changes in HHI within and between
the second and third quartiles of the competitiveness distribution do
not have statistically or economically significant welfare implications
for elderly heart disease patients. However, mergers that cause
nearby areas to move into the least competitive HHI, quartile (e.g.,
the highest, or first, quartile), or out of the most competitive HHI
quartile (e.g., the lowest, or fourth, quartile), significantly reduce
welfare for area residents with heart disease. Our finding that com-
petition improves welfare post-1990 is not affected by controlling for
other factors that may affect hospital market structure, such as hospi-
tal bed capacity utilization and legal reforms affecting medical prac-
tice (e.g., Kessler and McClellan 1996, 1997).
For example, in our principal model for the 1990s, we found that
reductions in competitiveness from the most to the least competitive
HHI quartile resulted in increased one-year heart-attack mortality
for elderly patients of approximately 1.5 percentage points (on a base
of one-year heart-attack mortality of 33 percent in 1994, 4.5 percent);
at the same time, such a change in market structure led to approxi-
mately 8 percent higher hospital expenditures for this population.
Point estimates of the effects of competition on expenditures were
substantially larger in areas with high HMO penetration than in
areas with low penetration, but the estimated effectsof competition
on both mortality and other outcomes related toquality of life were
similar.
IV.Implications for Antitrust Policy toward Hospital Mergers
Table 3.1 illustrates how our methods can be used to assess the wel-
fare implications of specific hospital mergers, using as examples two
hospital mergers that faced FTC scrutiny during 1994-95 (Leibenluft
et al. 1997). Based on patient preferences in 1994, table 3.1 answers
the key question asked by the Merger Guidelines: how would hospi-
tal market competitiveness HHI, change in response to the two
mergers, for the eight zip codes k nearest to each of the merging hos-68 Kessler and McClellan
Table 3.1
Predicted impact on quartiles of HI-ilk' of areas surrounding proposed hospital
mergers that were subjected to FTC action
Merger between
Port Huron Hospital, Port Huron,
Mercy Hospital, Port Huron, MI 48061 MI 48061
Freeman Hospital, Joplin, MO 64804 Oak Hill Hospital, Joplin, MO 64804

























48060 2 1 48060 2 1
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48027 2 1 48027 2 1
48040 2 1 48040 2 1
48074 2 1 48074 2 1
48032 2 1 48032 2 1
48006 2 1 48006 2 1


























64804 3 2 64804 3 2
64864 3 2 64864 3 2
64801 3 2 64801 3 2
64870 3 2 64870 3 2
64835 3 2 64835 3 2
64865 3 2 64865 3 2
64850 3 3 64850 3 3
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pitals? In particular, would either of the two hospital mergers we
examine result in a change in competitiveness for one or more zip-
code areas into the highest quartile, or out of the lowest quartile?
The top panel of table 3.1 assesses the impact of the proposed
merger between Mercy and Port Huron hospitals, the only two gen-
eral acute-care hospitals in Port Huron, Michigan (FTC vs. Local
Health System, Inc., C-3618 (consent order), 61 Fed. Reg. 31,119 (19
June 1996); No. 94 CV 74798 (E. D. Mich.); preliminary injunction
suit filed 30 November 1994). According to table 3.1, this merger
would have altered the structure of hospital markets in the sur-
rounding area in a way that reduced patient and social welfare.
Patients from every one of the surrounding eight zip codes would
have experienced an increase in HHIJ from the second to the least-
competitive quartile. For Medicare patients with heart disease, this
increase in concentration would have translated into both higher
expenditures and increased rates of adverse health outcomes.
The bottom panel of the table assesses the impact of the proposed
merger between Freeman and Oak Hill Hospitals in Joplin, Missouri
(FTC v. Freeman Hospital, FTC Docket No. 9273; 1995-1 Trade Cas.
71,037 (W. D. Mo.); aff'd 69 F.3d 260(8th Cir. 1995)). Although the
merger would have increased the concentration in seven of the eight
zip codes nearest to the hospitals, that increase in concentration from
the third to the second quartile of the competitiveness distribution
does not have statistically or economically significant welfare impli-
cations for elderly AMI patients.
Our completed studies have examined the welfare implications
in one service market only, the market for heart disease care in the
elderly. Our findings do not preclude the possibility that the mergers
would have adversely affected competition and reduced social wel-
fare in other markets. We also do not account for other potential
benefits of the mergers, such as their impact on nonelderly patients
and those with other illnesses. Less-acute conditions may provide
greater opportunities for patients to choose among hospitals, in turn
leading to greater competitiveness than for relatively acute illnesses.
On the other hand, chronic conditions also provide hospitals with
more opportunities to seek out profitable patients, both through
choices of service offerings and through the choice of health plans
with which the hospitals contract. Similarly, it is possible that pri-
vately insured patients would be affected differently by competition70 Kessler and McClellan
than Medicare-insured patients. We leave such issues to future work,
using the techniques that we have developed and applied here.
Our methods and findings do not imply that market-specific fac-
tors other than the relatively "exogenous" ones we have considered
should be omitted from merger analysis. Rather, our goal is to artic-
ulate a practical analytical framework that, consistent with the
Merger Guidelines, predicts accurately whether specific proposed
mergers lessen competition and harm patient and social welfare. Our
approach uses nationwide microdata to describe how particular
types of patients choose hospitals for care, and then to determine the
relationship between changes in local-area competitiveness, medical
treatment intensity, and patient health outcomes over time. Our
approach permits merger analyses to be driven by evidence on the
welfare consequences of changes in competitiveness from areas with
similar hospital choice and population characteristics, rather than
potentially biased measures of market structure.
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This method of delineating relevant geographic markets as the smallest area con-
taining suppliers of a fixed fraction of shipments was originally set out by Elzinga and
Hogarty (1978).
Indeed, Phibbs and Robinson (1993) show that academic medical-center status, an
accepted structural measure of hospital quality (e.g., Luft et al. 1990), is positively cor-
related with variable-radius market size.
Related problems with the variable-radius method lead to other biases in market
definition. For example, if the variable-radius method tends to measure true geo-
graphic market size with error, then effects of competition based on variable-radius
markets wifi be biased toward zero.
A variant on this method defines the relevant geographic market to consist of a
metropolitan statistical area (e.g., Dranove, Shanley, and White 1993), regardless of
actual patient flows within and beyond the MSA.
The bias from such measurement error may be even greater if, as is likely, the mea-
surement error is positively correlated with the competitiveness of the market. If the
true size of a hospital market is smaller than average in more-competitive areas (e.g.,
areas with relatively large numbers of hospitals), then fixed-radius geographic markets
will overstate the competitiveness of more competitive markets, and will understateDesigning Hospital Antitrust Policy to Promote Social Welfare 71
the competitiveness of less competitive markets. Such correlation is likely because
increase in geographic market size, all else constant, increase measured competition, so
that estimates of the impact of competition are smaller in absolute value than the
actual impact of competition.
The original MAR hypothesis was formulated around the idea that hospitals com-
pete for patients through competition for their physicians, by providing a wide range
of equipment and service capabilities. Greater availability of equipment may induce
physicians to admit their patients to a hospital for several reasons. If physicians are
uncertain about the necessity of various intensive treatments at the time the admission
decision is made, then additional service capabilities may allow them to provide
higher-quality care. Also, to the extent that high-tech equipment is a complement to
compensated physician effort, additional equipment may allow physicians to bill for
more services; to the extent that equipment is a substitute for uncompensated physi-
cian effort, additional equipment allows physicians to work less for the same level of
compensation.
Competition among hospitals may seem relevant only to privately insured patients
and government patients in managed-care plans, and not most Medicare patients.
"Traditional" Medicare compensates hospitals on the basis of a diagnosis-related
group (DRG) payment system. Because the DRG system appears to compensate hospi-
tals on a fixed-price basis per admission for treatment, and Medicare does not bargain
with individual hospitals, Medicare patients might appear to be less affected by com-
petition due to the "high-powered" payment incentives to minimize cost. However,
competition may affect Medicare patients both through "direct" and "spillover"
effects.
Competition may have direct effects on Medicare patients because the intensity of
treatment of all health problems may vary enormously, and because the DRG system
actually contains important elements of cost sharing (McClellan 1994, 1997). For exam-
ple, many DRGs are related to intensive treatment such as cardiac catheterization and
bypass surgery, rather than to diagnoses such as heart attack. Thus, for most health
problems, hospitals that provide more intensive treatment and incur higher costs can
receive considerable additional payments. To the extent that Medicare provides hospi-
tals with low-powered, cost-plus incentives, it may support MAR-type quality compe-
tition and thereby create social losses due to the provision of excessive care.
Even if reimbursement rules and other factors limit the direct impact of competition
on publicly insured patients in programs like Medicare, competition for privately in-
sured patients may have important spillover effects. To the extent that competition
improves the efficiency of treatment of private insured patients and physicians do not
develop distinctive practice patterns for the private and public patients they treat,
Medicare patients will also benefit (Baker 1996). For example, a hospital's decision not
to adopt a low-value technology benefits all patients, even if that choice primarily
resulted from pressure by private managed-care insurers. Similarly, increased provi-
sion of information by provides for private purchasers may have external benefits for
all patients. Conversely, spifiovers might harm Medicare patients. For example, to the
extent that hospitals do develop separate practice patterns for Medicare and private
insured patients, hospitals may have a greater incentive to provide intensive treat-
ments for Medicare beneficiaries, to recover the fixed costs of equipment that private
insurers will not defray.
Alternatively, wealthier or more highly educated patients may seek out such hospi-
tals, so that the hospitals have a healthier-than-average case mix, and competition
would appear to have a greater impact on outcomes than it truly does. The main point72 Kessler and McClellan
is that the hospital-based measures of competition will be biased if quality differences
have different effects on the choices of more or less severely ill patients.
9. Patients in higher-income zip codes may have intrinsically better survival capa-
bilities. However, in a detailed analysis of medical chart review data, McClellan and
Noguchi (1998) found no substantial correlations between disease severity and dis-
tances to alternative hospital types. We also include "fixed effects" for zip codes in all
of our models to remove any persistent differences in health at the zip code level.
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